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The 2008 Presidential Election and the
Future of Lebanon
Lebanonwire.com 6/22/08
After a long and protracted period of concern and anxiety, the crucial and
probably the most important step towards saving Lebanon has been achieved. Based
on the Doha Agreement, General Michel Suleiman was elected in the Lebanese
Parliament by a near unanimous vote. His coming to power was also supported by
Arab and International consensus and his election was witnessed by key delegates
representing Arab, Middle Eastern, European and American authorities. The fact
that this Lebanese army commander, who has a proven record of wisdom, courage,
integrity and unifying leadership was elected by a constitutional democratic
process, somewhat compensated the Lebanese presidency for some of its diminished
powers that resulted from the Taef Accords.
The presidential election produced an almost immediate change of atmosphere in
the country. Life came back promptly to downtown Beirut and most Lebanese
regions. Planes coming to Beirut International Airport are full of tourists and
returning Lebanese expatriates; while hotels and restaurants seem to be nearly
full and reservations are difficult to obtain. The Beirut Stock Market started
rising almost instantaneously, and the general economic activity appears very
promising.
Attention is now focused on the implementation of the next step of the Doha
Agreements; i.e. the formation of the national unity government. The process of
selecting 16 ministers by the majority, 11 by the minority group and 3 by the
president may not be very respectful of the Lebanese constitutional process.
Nevertheless, given the value of Doha in saving Lebanon from an extremely
dangerous crisis and the risk of civil war, there is broad support to expedite
this step without nitpicking or unnecessary delays.
There is, however, some concern that there may be inappropriate obstacles and
risks of ending up with a government of opponents, residuals of feudal and
militia lords, plus relatives, friends and chronic politicians with dubious
past, interested primarily in using State resources to improve their chances in
the upcoming parliamentary election. Despite all possible imperfections, the
country may accept such government, if formed promptly and safely, to avoid the
risks of security deterioration in case the ministerial stalemate becomes
protracted and indefinitely prolonged. In fact the mobile security incidents in
various regions and the continued incitement by some media outlets, belonging to
both majority and minority, are contrary to the text and spirit of Doha and
apply further pressure to expedite the formation of the new ministerial cabinet.
However, noting the apparent difficulties and delays in forming such an
imperfect cabinet due to the greed or obstinacy of some or many politicians, the
question arises why not attempt to work towards a reform oriented government?
The Lebanese President according to the current constitution has to sign the
decrees nominating all ministers together with the Prime Minister. This is one
of the key responsibilities and authorities he still has after Taef. Therefore,
he has the final word in approving all ministerial nominations whether coming
from majority, minority or whoever is involved. He can therefore set criteria
for the choice of the ministers that the majority or minority may choose
according to the Doha Agreement.
Considering his constitutional prerogatives, plus the moral authority he enjoys,
being elected as a consensus and unity head of State with broad internal and
external support, the President should not settle for a possibly mediocre
cabinet, where ministers may be antagonistic with each other and may have more
interest in selfish objectives than in public service. The President could set
criteria primarily focusing on integrity and fighting graft. Unity will be
easier to achieve by focusing on reform since nobody will dare protect or defend
corruption or the perception of such. Considering that this government will be
responsible for the planning and execution of the upcoming parliamentary
elections within less than one year, it may therefore be advisable to exclude
from ministerial appointments all current deputies or candidates for the next
election. In fact, there may be here a golden opportunity to implement the
principle of separation of the executive authority from legislative
responsibility. We and many political parties and expatriate groups proposed
long time ago that such separation may be the most important first step in
starting genuine and effective political reforms. Such step may also remove
obstacles, facilitate and speed up the process of forming the new government.
We are now hearing that if the "national unity government" can not be formed in
48 hours, two months or other deadlines, we should move towards a "temporary
government", "transition government" or other nomenclatures. We wonder why not
have, all three characteristics, as soon as possible, in one "quality
government". In fact the so called "national unity government" is also in a way
temporary or transitory, since in less than one year a new government will be
formed, immediately after the completion of the parliamentary elections.
Therefore the President should have every right and reason to set criteria for
the selection of an extra-parliamentarian, reform oriented government. In
addition, in order to respect the text and spirit of Doha he could work with the
Prime Minister to select 16 ministers in consultation with the majority and 11
ministers with the minority. When selections become based on capability and
integrity the issues of "sovereign portfolios" and "service portfolios" become
less critical and the choice of the 3 ministers allocated to the President in
the Doha accords becomes easier. Politicians should remember that Lebanese
citizens, in and outside Lebanon, are much more interested in seeing solutions
for their country's security and economic problems than in the share that
various politicians will get for selfish gain in the upcoming cabinet. We
strongly believe that President Suleiman does have the integrity, the moral
authority and the duty to take these matters into consideration.
Following the formation of such government, hopefully without undue delay, the
electoral 1960 Law, agreed upon in Doha, will need to be established in
parliament. Dialogue will then start in Baabda under presidential leadership and
security measures will be tightened to assure all citizens, visitors, investors
and tourists, that peace and justice will be fully enforced.
While there is consensus that the electoral law proposed in Doha, based mainly
on the 1960 circumscriptions, is clearly better than the 2000 Law engineered by
the Syrian officer Ghazi Kanaan to secure certain convenient results, everybody
agrees that there are imperfections and loopholes that can be improved upon. A
reform-minded, extra-parliamentarian, unity government may have no problem
eliminating the loopholes, as well as implementing some of the progressive
proposals contained in Fouad Boutros Committee's effort to modernize and secure
a fairer process.
Overall, a unity reform oriented government composed of dedicated moderate
ministers will be easier for the president and prime minister to work with to
better serve citizens' interests, solve delayed and chronic problems and secure
a representative, fair and free election. It will also allow the hope and
optimism resulting from the election of the new president to materialize and
concretize towards the dream of a stable, united, free, strong and prosperous
country. We sincerely hope the President will provide the necessary leadership
and the politicians will not miss this golden opportunity to support him in
setting Lebanon on the long awaited course.
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American
Lebanese Foundation